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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1041 
_____________ 
 
TARUN PATEL,  
Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order 
Of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
(Agency No. A205-256-758) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Miriam K. Mills 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 19, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge,* HARDIMAN and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 9, 2017) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION 
______________________
                                              
* Judge McKee concluded his term as Chief of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit on September 30, 2016. 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Chief Judge. 
Tarun Patel seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ ruling to accept 
the Immigration Judge’s ruling ordering his deportation. Patel argues that the 
Immigration Judge abused her discretion when she denied his motion for continuance and 
deemed his asylum application waived. 
For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review.  
I. 
Because we write for the parties who are familiar with the factual and procedural 
history of this case, we provide only the background necessary to our conclusions. 
On May 20, 2013 and April 7, 2014, the Immigration Judge granted Patel 
continuances in order for his counsel to have additional time to prepare applications for 
relief. On the latter date, Patel appeared before the Immigration Judge and indicated that 
he was still in the process of filing an asylum petition. Although the Immigration Judge 
noted that the asylum application would be untimely, the Judge granted the continuance 
but stated that Patel would be expected to file the asylum application at the next hearing 
on August 18, 2014.1 
At the August 18, 2014 hearing, Patel did not submit an asylum application but 
stated, rather, that he was contemplating voluntary departure. However, Patel requested 
another continuance to again investigate the possibility of filing for asylum because Patel 
                                              
1 The record indicates that the Immigration Judge clearly stated that Patel must file his 
asylum application at the August 18, 2014 hearing. Patel nonetheless argues that he was 
not made aware of the absolute nature of the deadline to file for asylum. 
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had heard that his brother in India had been kidnapped the week before. The Immigration 
Judge denied the continuance, deemed Patel’s opportunity to file an asylum application 
waived, and entered an Order of Removal because Patel failed to demonstrate good cause 
for a continuance and because his removal proceedings had been pending for over two 
years.  
 Patel appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing that the Immigration 
Judge abused her discretion in denying the motion for continuance. The Board disagreed 
and dismissed the appeal.  This petition for review followed.  
II. 
We review both the Board’s and Immigration Judge’s decisions.2 The Immigration 
Judge’s denial of a continuance request in removal proceedings is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.3  We also review the Immigration Judge’s determination that the right to file 
an application or document was waived for abuse of discretion.4  Accordingly, we will 
not reverse the Immigration Judge’s ruling unless the decision was “arbitrary, irrational, 
or contrary to law.”5 
An immigration judge may “grant a motion for continuance for good cause 
                                              
2 This Court may review both the Board’s and Immigration Judge’s decisions when the 
Board’s decision “substantially relies upon” the Immigration Judge’s decision. Kaita v. 
Atty. Gen. of U.S., 522 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 2008). 
3 Khan v. Atty. Gen. of U.S., 448 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2006). 
4 See Dediji v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (reviewing application of 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) for abuse of discretion).  
5 Contreras v. Atty. Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 578, 583 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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shown.”6 “The question whether denial of a continuance in an immigration proceeding 
constitutes an abuse of discretion cannot be decided through the application of bright-line 
rules; it must be resolved on a case by case basis according to the facts and circumstances 
of each case.”7 
Patel argues that the denial of his continuance request amounted to an abuse of 
discretion because he should have been granted additional time to gather evidence 
regarding his brother’s recent kidnapping. Patel’s counsel urged that the kidnapping may 
provide a basis for an asylum claim.  
The Immigration Judge held that Patel’s motion for continuance was not supported 
by good cause because Patel presented no evidence that his brother had actually been 
kidnapped.8  We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion here because the facts 
regarding the kidnapping were merely speculative and no evidence was presented to 
support that claim.9  Not surprisingly, Patel cites to no persuasive authority to support his 
argument that the Immigration Judge abused her discretion in denying his continuance 
request. 
For the same reason, the Immigration Judge did not abuse her discretion in ruling 
that Patel’s asylum application was waived. An immigration judge “may set and extend 
                                              
6 Hashmi v. Atty. Gen. of U.S., 531 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.29) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
7 Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 
F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
8 Without referring this Court to any portion of the record, Patel claims that he offered to 
testify about his brother’s kidnapping on August 18, 2014. This Court could not uncover 
anywhere in the record where Patel offered to testify. 
9 Khan, 448 F.3d at 235.  
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time limits for the filing of applications and related documents.”10 If the application is not 
filed within the time set by the immigration judge, “the opportunity to file that 
application or document shall be deemed waived.”11  
Here, the Immigration Judge granted Patel’s request for a continuance at the April 
7, 2014 hearing for the purpose of allowing Patel time to complete and file his asylum 
application at the next hearing date, even though an asylum application would then have 
been untimely. At the next hearing date, however, Patel did not file an asylum application 
but rather indicated that he was contemplating voluntary departure. Because Patel failed 
to file his asylum application within the time set by the Immigration Judge, the Judge 
properly exercised her discretion in concluding that Patel had waived his opportunity to 
file for asylum.12 
III.  
For the reasons set forth above, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                              
10 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c). 
11 Id. 
12 Patel states in his brief that the waiver of his asylum application violated his “due 
process procedural rights.” To the extent that Patel raises a due process claim, that 
argument also fails. To establish this claim, Patel “must show that he was prevented from 
reasonably presenting his case.” Uspango v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Patel has failed to make any such 
showing. He alleges only that his due process rights were violated because he and his 
counsel were not made aware of the Immigration Judge’s “absolute deadline” for filing 
the asylum application and the consequences of not meeting that deadline. However, 
Patel was granted a requested continuance to allow time to file an asylum application, 
even though such application would have been untimely.  Therefore, there is no due 
process violation. See Khan, 448 F.3d at 236 (rejecting petitioner’s claim that denial of a 
continuance request violated his due process rights because he could not show that he 
was prevented from reasonably presenting his case and that his argument “merely recasts 
his abuse-of-discretion argument in constitutional terms”). 
